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Information technology security policies are designed explicitly to protect IT systems.
However, overly restrictive information security policies may be inadvertently creating
an unforeseen information risk by encouraging users to bypass protected systems in favor
of personal devices, where the potential loss of organizational intellectual property is
greater.
Current models regarding the acceptance and use of technology, Technology Acceptance
Model Version 3 (TAM3) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
Version 2 (UTAUT2), address the use of technology in organizations and by consumers,
but little research has been done to identify an appropriate model to begin to understand
what factors would influence users that can choose between using their own personal
device and using organizational IT assets, separate and distinct from “bring your own
device” constructs. There are few organizations with radical demarcations between
organizational assets and personal devices. One such organization, the United States
Intelligence Community (USIC), provides a controlled environment where personal
devices are expressly forbidden in workspaces and therefore provides a uniquely situated
organizational milieu in that the use of personal devices would have to occur outside of
the organizational environment. This research aims to bridge the divide between these
choices by identifying the factors that influence users to select their own devices to
overcome organizational restrictions in order to conduct open-source research.
The research model was amalgamated from the two primary theoretical frameworks,
TAM3 and UTAUT2, and is the first to integrate these theories as they relate to the
intention to use personal or organizational systems to address the choices employees
make when choosing between personal and organizational assets to accomplish work
related tasks. Using survey data collected from a sample of 240 employees of the USIC,
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) statistical techniques
were used to evaluate and test the model, estimate the path relationships, and provide
reliability and validity checks.
The results indicated that the Perception of Risk in the Enterprise (PoRE) significantly
increased the Intention to Use Private Internet and decreased the Intention to Use
Enterprise devices, as well as increasing the Perceived Ease of Use of Private Internet
(PEUPI). The results of this study provide support to the concept that organizations must
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do more to balance threats to information systems with threats to information security.
The imposition of safeguards to protect networks and systems, as well as employee
misuse of information technology resources, may unwittingly incentivize users to use
their own Internet and devices instead, where enterprise safeguards and protections are
absent. This incentive is particularly pronounced when organizations increase the
perceived threat of risk to users, whether intentional or inadvertent, and when the
perception of the ease of use and usefulness of private Internet devices is high.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Insider threats have existed for millennia, acknowledged in the earliest known
writings, including in the histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus where he described
Greek spies being spared by Xerxes (Herodotus & Grene, 1987). Sun Tzu also recognized
insider threats in his famous treatise On the Art of War, where he identified five classes of
spies, including “having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a
district” and “having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy” (Sawyer &
Sawyer, 1994, p. 67). Insider threats are nothing new, but the vastness of information that
can be compromised by one trusted insider have increased exponentially since the advent
of the Information Age. Indeed, Bickers (2000) cited the potential loss of company
information as a restraining factor in beginning to conduct e-commerce.
Despite the multitude of historical examples, research into insider threats to
information systems has long been neglected in favor of the perceived threats posed by
external factors, such as viruses, worms, hackers, and others (T. Brown, 2018; Gordon &
Loeb, 2002; Wang, 2019). This general trend continues, with recent research by Beckett
(2015) indicating that while organizations have doubled their spending to protect
themselves against the loss of information and systems, the vast majority of spending has
been to harden systems against external threats. One potential reason for this divide is the
lack of reliable data concerning insider threats, as organizations aim to minimize the
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damage caused by malicious insiders and therefore limit their exposure to the secondary
and tertiary effects of losses (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009).
Despite the focus on systems and processes for identifying threats to information
systems against external threats, and the recognition of the threats posed by malicious
insiders, a comprehensive and systematic review of the literature reveals there has been
little study or effort to identify ways in which critical information can be exposed by nonmalicious insiders who use personal devices to conduct work related tasks outside of the
organizational information systems infrastructure.
Within intelligence agencies, there exists two distinct types of information: closed (or
classified) sources and open sources. Closed sources consist of information collected in
such a way that the origin, knowledge, or method by which the information is collected
must be protected from disclosure (Richelson, 2018). Open sources consist of any other
information that is available, such as websites, newspapers, magazines, subscription
services, academic journals, Internet websites, and television broadcasts (M. Glassman &
Kang, 2012). The Director of National Intelligence provided a formal definition of Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT) in 2011 as “intelligence produced from publicly available
information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an
appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement”
(H. Williams & Blum, 2018, p. ix). Despite the recognition of the value and use of
OSINT for over 50 years, the United States government continues to evolve the definition
and characterization of OSINT as both an intelligence discipline and what it consists of.
Similar to academia and the general population, the Internet is now the primary
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mechanism by which OSINT is collected and reviewed by intelligence personnel (M.
Glassman & Kang, 2012).
Management and organizational restrictions regarding Internet usage within large
organizations are common (Coles-Kemp & Theoharidou, 2010; J. Glassman et al., 2015;
Schulman, 2001; Symantec, 2016). Management and organizational Internet restrictions
within agencies of the U.S. government are managed by policies detailing ethical
guidelines (Department of Defense, 2012), however, these restrictions impede the ability
of intelligence analysts to conduct Internet based research (M. Glassman & Kang, 2012).
These restrictions include prohibitions on “viewing, storage, copying or transmission of
materials related to…illegal weapons, terrorist activities or any other illegal activities or
activities otherwise prohibited” (Frederick, 2014, para. 8.7). Offensive, prohibited and
resource intensive websites, such as video and audio streaming services, are frequently
blocked by Web filtering tools (United States Cyber Command, 2020). These restrictions
are specifically applicable to the unofficial use of IT systems, allowing for access to these
materials and subjects for official purposes, but through practice and design, there are
limited methods to differentiate between official and unofficial use except in ex post facto
reviews (Frederick, 2014).
There is a gap in the literature to understand the motivations and choices employees
make to choose between enterprise systems and personal systems to accomplish work
related tasks. Colvin described “non-malicious” information technology misuse as
situations in which an “employee improvises, takes short cuts, or works around IT
procedures and guidelines in order to perform their assigned tasks”(Colvin, 2016, p. 2).
In keeping with Colvin’s findings that non-malicious IT use tends to be motivated by
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internal factors such as performance, intelligence analysts that wish to avoid lengthy
review processes in which they have to justify accessing prohibited content, or
burdensome processes required for requesting permission in advance, may choose to
forego accessing potentially challenging materials while using government systems,
opting instead to use personal devices and networks to access information, potentially
exposing information unwittingly.
These concerns are not purely speculative or remote. Advanced intelligence collection
systems that act as a man in the middle attack on cellular telephones and devices, known
colloquially as IMSI catchers and Stingrays, have been discovered near U.S. intelligence
and defense facilities, lend credence to the concept that the use of personal devices may
unwittingly expose information (Fleischer et al., 2018; Fredericks, 2018; Timberg, 2018).
As a result, employees who fully comply with applicable restrictions while operating
enterprise IT systems may unknowingly expose critical information by conducting
research using personal equipment, such as at home or using mobile devices in order to
accomplish work tasks. The use of personal Internet access devices, including such
generally benign devices like fitness trackers, have revealed confidential and sensitive
information (Ching & Singh, 2016; Lidynia et al., 2017). In 2018, a security flaw in a
mobile fitness application revealed “6,400 users believed to be exercising at sensitive
locations, including the NSA, the White House, MI6 in London, and the Guantanamo
Bay detention center in Cuba, as well as personnel working on foreign military bases”
(Whittaker, 2018, para. 10). In another example, the location of U.S. military personnel
engaged in combat operations in Syria and Afghanistan were revealed through another
fitness tracking device (Sly, 2018). In January 2020, partially as a result of the threats
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posed by personal device usage, members of the U.S. Army’s 82 nd Airborne Division
were ordered to leave all personal electronic devices in the United States when they were
deployed to Kuwait following hostilities with Iran (Rempfer, 2020). While the use of
personal devices did not violate organizational policies (Sisk, 2018), nor did they involve
organizational information systems, they exposed highly sensitive information to
potential adversaries.

Problem Statement
Organizations that impose significant restrictions on Internet use increase the
likelihood that employees will use personal devices outside of the organization to conduct
work related tasks, which in turn, escalates information security risks (Gundu &
Flowerday, 2012; Hovav & Putri, 2016). The use of Web filters and other information
technology approaches to limit the accessibility of potentially inflammatory,
objectionable, or ostensibly non work-related websites are largely effective in reducing
employee misuse of information technology resources (J. Glassman et al., 2015);
however, when access to Internet resources that are necessary to accomplishing work
related tasks are restricted, these constraints may encourage employees to bypass
organizational constraints by using their own devices and networks to access Internet
based information. The use of personal devices and Internet resources to conduct work
related activities increase the risk of information compromise (Garba et al., 2015; Hovav
& Putri, 2016).
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Dissertation Goal
The purpose of this dissertation research was to assess the influence the perception of
risk has on the behavioral intention and use behavior of personally-owned Internet
devices and access to conduct open-source research among members of the United States
Intelligence Community. Selected constructs derived from the Unified Theory of
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model (Venkatesh et al., 2003), the
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Venkatesh et al., 2012) and validated extensions
of UTAUT (Dwivedi et al., 2019) were used to establish a proposed structural path model
to assess the impact the perception of risk has on user selection of enterprise or personal
devices when conducting open-source research for work purposes.
There have been extensive studies evaluating how, when, and why users accept and
use technology. The two primary competing models reflect the differences between the
organizational use of technology and how consumers use technology. The primary
models used to understand how technology is used within organizations is known as the
Technology Acceptance Model 3 (TAM3) (Venkatesh & Bala, 2008), which includes
antecedents such as voluntariness, perceived ease of use, as well as perceptions of
external control. Recognizing that models developed to understand how well users
accept technology they are required to use for employment and provided to them in an
organizational environment is fundamentally different from technology users choose for
their personal use, an alternative theory known as the Unified Theory of Acceptance And
Use Of Technology (UTAUT) was developed and later extended into UTAUT Version 2
(UTAUT2) (Venkatesh et al., 2003, 2012). UTAUT2 is similar in many ways to TAM3
but reflects the unique influences that individual choice has on using technology, such as
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incorporating age, gender, and experience as moderating factors. While TAM3 is well
suited to evaluating technology acceptance in organizations, UTAUT2 is generally better
suited and designed to accomplish this for individual consumers. The UTAUT2 model is
generally considered the most well-developed of the technology acceptance models
focused on non-organizational use of technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003; M. Williams et
al., 2015)
Conceptually, this research attempted to bridge the gap between the various
acceptance theories by examining what factors influence users to select personal Internet
access devices over organizational systems to accomplish work related tasks.
Additionally, this research incorporated the impact that the perception of risk, as a
surrogate for security, has on the behavioral intention and use behavior of employees to
avoid use restrictions and other barriers to accessing the Internet. This research model
incorporated selected constructs as antecedents to behavioral intention and use behavior
derived from the TAM3 and UTAUT2 models and well as the inclusion of attitude as
codified in a revised UTAUT model (Dwivedi et al., 2019). The research model was used
to investigate what effect organizational policies, along with perception of risk, have on
users selecting between organizational resources and personal devices to conduct work
related activities.
The use of personal devices and systems to accomplish work related information
gathering tasks likely does not pose a direct threat to information systems of an
organization; however, the use of extra-organizational resources, such as personally
owned smart phones or home computers, may introduce unintended risks to sensitive
information (Garba et al., 2015). Intelligence professionals provide a unique social milieu
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in which to examine the factors influencing personal device usage, as they are prohibited
by law and policy from possessing or using personal devices within their work spaces
(National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2017). This policy prohibiting the
possession and use of personal devices allows for a clear demarcation between
organizational IT devices and other situations wherein personal devices are not provided
by the organization but are authorized for use, such as is the case with “Bring Your Own
Device” (BYOD) situations where users are authorized to use their own devices to
conduct work tasks (Hovav & Putri, 2016).
By examining this unique population to determine whether the perception of risk
inadvertently influences individuals to conduct work related activities using personally
owned Internet access, a broader understanding of the impact of enterprise use policies
has on organizations, including potentially exposing confidential information to
adversaries, is realized (Fleischer et al., 2018; Fredericks, 2018; Timberg, 2018).
Additionally, this research provides insights into user risk perception, allowing
organizations to make informed decisions as to what Internet use policies are appropriate
and develop remediation strategies to mitigate risks.

Research Questions
Open Source Intelligence, or the collection of information that is publicly available, is
a frequent and routine function for intelligence analysts (M. Glassman & Kang, 2012).
The most common method for conducting open-source research is through the Internet
due to the vast amount of timely and accurate information available on a multitude of
topics and issues. Despite the recognition of the value of open-source research,
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organizational and institutional Internet use policies that habitually prevent access to
routine sources of information, often in the form of enterprise-wide restrictions (H.
Williams & Blum, 2018). The ubiquity of the Internet and the ease in which intelligence
professionals can conduct open-source research using their personal devices, and
avoiding enterprise restrictions tempered by the perception of risk, forms the foundation
for this research. The following primary research question was derived from the
antecedents and moderating variables that comprise UTAUT2, TAM3, and related
extensions of these theoretical models:
RQ: What is the relationship between the perception of risk and how members of the
US Intelligence Community intend to conduct open-source research?

Relevance and Significance
This study blended the foundational concepts found within TAM and UTAUT and
applied them in a unique situation where the influences found in institutional aspects of
accepting and using technology combine and contrast against a personal choice in
selecting the use of personal Internet access devices to accomplish a work task in the
form of conducting open-source research. The study population is highly segmented in
terms of isolation from the use of personal devices at work locations, as BYOD is not
only unavailable, but prohibited by policy and law. Therefore, the blurring of lines
between personal and organization equipment and networks found with most study
populations, such as corporate or academic situations, does not exist. The prohibition of
personal devices within work spaces allows for a marked delineation between personal
and professional equipment and networks, providing the opportunity to isolate
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uncontrollable variables and more clearly identify the role the perception of risk plays in
the selection of personal equipment to conduct open-source research in support of workrelated tasks.

Barriers and Issues
Several barriers and issues were addressed while conducting this research. The
primary barrier that would have affected this study is the failure to acquire a sufficient
number of quantitative samples. This barrier was mitigated by engineering a variety of
pathways for survey subjects to respond, with each pathway serving as a potential
complete source for responses. The pathways used to collect survey data included a
commercial survey application on the Internet known as Typeform, Sharepoint survey
tools hosted on a Department of Defense network known as the Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRnet) as well within an unclassified Department of Defense enclave
linked to Typeform, each serving as a method to ensure the correct population is being
sampled as well as ensuring the validity of the responses. The use of classified networks,
primarily SIPRnet, introduced additional challenges, such as the ability to extract survey
responses, but provided a milieu in which only Intelligence Community personnel can
reply, ensuring the validity of the sample population. The use of the primary Intelligence
Community network, known as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System (JWICS), was considered but ultimately discarded due to significant challenges in
extracting completed survey results. Combining samples to ensure a sufficient number of
valid samples was incorporated following statistical analysis to ensure the similarity of
the responses.
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Another potential barrier was that the results would be unusable stemming from
biases and other factors that would make the outputs unusable for analysis. This potential
barrier was ameliorated through the use of validated survey questions, thoughtful survey
design, pretesting, and conscientious administration of the survey.

Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
One of the primary limitations is the use of self-reporting as the primary mechanism
for data collection. While self-reporting is a frequent and common method for
organizational and management research, research has shown that responses can be
biased towards socially desirable answers (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Additionally,
significant variability exists between reported actions and their actual frequency of use
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).
The study was limited to members of the United States Intelligence Community
(USIC), which encompasses personnel physically located around the world (Richelson,
2018). As such, the location of the study was distributed, but through the use of
controlled access to common platforms which only USIC members can access, this
limitation was managed. The organizational culture of each organization of the USIC
varies, and collection of demographic data, including the mission category of
respondents, length of time in the IC, pay category, and other population demographics,
will serve as useful data for further analysis.
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Delimitations
This study was limited to members of the US Intelligence Community. The sample
included staff, contractors, as well as military members. The study differentiated between
members who use open-source materials in their work and those who do not.

Definition of Terms
Cybersecurity. Computing-based discipline involving technology, people,
information, and processes to enable assured operations. It involves the creation,
operation, analysis, and testing of secure computer systems. It is an interdisciplinary
course of study, including aspects of law, policy, human factors, ethics, and risk
management in the context of adversaries”(Burley et al., 2018, p. 919)
Delphi method. “An iterative process to collect and distill the anonymous
judgments of experts using a series of data collection and analysis techniques interspersed
with feedback” (Skulmoski et al., 2007, p. 1)
Information system. A “work system whose processes and activities are devoted to
processing information, that is, capturing, transmitting, storing, retrieving, manipulating,
and displaying information”(Alter, 2008, p. 453)
Insider threat. “An insider can thus be defined with regard to two primitive
actions: 1. violation of a security policy using legitimate access, and 2. violation of an
access control policy by obtaining unauthorized access” (Bishop & Gates, 2008, p. 15:2)
Open Source Intelligence. “…intelligence produced from publicly available
information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an
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appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement”
(H. Williams & Blum, 2018, p. ix)
Perceived risk. The assessment of an individual “composed of individual
judgments regarding the likelihood that the unfavorable experience will happen, and the
impact of that experience were it to happen” (Boss, 2007, p. 27)
Risk. “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise
if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (Barrett, 2018,
p. 46)
List of Acronyms
APCO. Antecedents–Privacy Concerns–Outcomes
AVE. Average Variance Extracted
BI. Behavioral Intent
BYOD. Bring Your Own Device
CMB. Common Method Bias
CMV. Common Method Variance
DISL Defense Intelligence Senior Leader
DOD. Department of Defense
EO. Executive Order
GS. Government Service
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HTMT. Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT)
IC. Intelligence Community
IDT. Innovation diffusion theory
IMSI. International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IP. Internet Protocol
IRB. Institutional Review Board
IS. Information System
IT. Information Technology
IUIPC. Internet Users Information Privacy Concerns
JWICS. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
MI6. Military Intelligence, Section 6
MM. Motivation model
MPCU. Model of PC utilization
NSA. National Security Agency
ODNI. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSINT. Open Source Intelligence
PEUEI. Perceived Ease of Use of Enterprise Internet
PEUPI. Perceived Ease of Use of Private Internet
PLSc. Partial Least Squares – Consistent
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PLS-SEM. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling
PoRE. Perception of Risk – Enterprise
PUEI. Perceived Usefulness of Enterprise Internet
PUPI Perceived Usefulness of Private Internet
SCT. Social Cognitive Theory
SES. Senior Executive Service
SIPRnet. Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
TAM. Technology Acceptance Model
TAM2. Technology Acceptance Model Version 2
TAM3. Technology Acceptance Model Version 3
TOR. The Onion Router
TPB. Theory of Planned Behavior
TRA. Theory of Reasoned Action
USIC. United States Intelligence Community
UTAUT. Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
UTAUT2. Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology Version 2
VIF. Variance Inflation Factor
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Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a research question, supported by
presenting the background, research goals, relevance and significance, barriers and issues
as well as potential limitations and delimitations for this research. The background
established the pervasiveness of insider threats and the unwitting nature of potential
compromises by users. The research goal identifies what this study aimed to accomplish
and the research question focused and shaped the literature review. The relevance and
significance section reinforced the problem statement and research goal while the barriers
and issues sections identified potential concerns with the successful completion of this
research. The limitations and delimitations identified issues that were recognized but
were unable to be controlled, as well as the scope of the research population. The
definition of terms and acronyms provides clear and unambiguous meanings to terms
used in this dissertation report.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction
Within the study of information systems, the basis for why and how users accept
technology is an extensively studied concept. These efforts have led to an evolution of
various models and theories being developed and expanded over the years, primarily
within organizational constructs. Previous studies examining how and when people use
technology have largely approached the issue in a bifurcated manner, examining the use
of technology in organizations and by consumers as discrete and separate (Venkatesh et
al., 2012; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008)
One of the most advanced and developed of these theories is the Unified Theory of
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), identified by Venkatesh et al. (2003).
UTAUT aimed to incorporate the primary operant theory, the Technology Acceptance
Model, with other predictive theories of acceptance to produce a “best of breed”
amalgamated model that has a greater predictive value than the individual components
(M. Williams et al., 2015). Expanding on previous work, this model is well grounded in
theory and provides for an understanding of the various concepts that influence
acceptance, and includes performance expectation, effort expectancy, social influence and
facilitating conditions as the primary factors that influence behavioral intention, leading
to actual use. Affecting these primary determinants are key moderators of gender, age,
experience and voluntariness of use, which seeks to account for individual variables.
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Acceptance and Use Models
While UTAUT has proven to be an excellent predictor of acceptance within
organizational structures, its predictive capabilities have proven to be of less value when
addressing consumer use contexts. To address these shortcomings, Venkatesh et al. (2012)
developed an extension of the UTAUT model, known as UTAUT2. A brief review of the
evolution of user acceptance models provides context to how UTAUT2 was developed, as
well as how the conceptualization of privacy within the UTAUT2 framework comports to
the foundational concepts previously established.
The foundational concepts regarding user acceptance of technology are largely based
on a theory from the social psychology discipline called the Theory of Reasoned Action
(TRA) which was developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1973). TRA proposes that a person’s
behavior, referred to as actual behavior, is largely determined by a construct referred to as
behavioral intent (BI) and defined as “a measure of the strength of one’s intention to
perform a specified behavior” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 984). In 1986, Fred Davis took the
theory of reasoned action and developed an adaptation of it specific to information
systems, which was later known as the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis,
1985, 1989; Davis et al., 1989). His technology acceptance model, and its derivative
works, have formed the bedrock of a vast amount of the scholarly research in information
systems.
As work with TAM continued through the 1990’s and into the 2000’s, the focus
shifted to the task of better identifying variables by which to operationalize the constructs
of TAM and to expanding the scope of TAM, including efforts to test the outer boundaries
of the theory’s applicability by validating it based on factors such as culture, gender, and
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nationality (Adams et al., 1992; Y. Lee et al., 2003; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh
& Davis, 2000). In 2000, Venkatesh and Davis published an expanded technology
acceptance model, which sought to conceptually expand TAM by theorizing the
determinate constructs which drive perceived usefulness and to explore some moderators
of those constructs (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000).
In 2003, a group of researchers, including Davis and Venkatesh, embarked on an effort
to combine TAM with theories of acceptance originating from other disciplines to create
a model that would bring the best predictive capabilities of the various models together
into one theory (Venkatesh et al., 2003). The eight theories that were amalgamated were
the theory of reasoned action (TRA), from which TAM had been derived; TAM and its
TAM2 extension; the motivational model (MM) taken from psychology; the theory of
planned behavior (TPB), an extension of TRA; a combined TAM and TPB (C-TAMTPB); the model of PC utilization (MPCU), a native information systems theory that
contrasts with TRA and TPB; social cognitive theory (SCT) taken from psychology; and
finally, the innovation diffusion theory (IDT) taken from sociology (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). The researchers compared the constructs of each model and derived an
amalgamation that had greater predictive value than the eight individual models. The
resultant theory is known as the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
(UTAUT), which is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
Performance
Expectancy
Effort
Expectancy
Behavioral
Intention
Social Influence
Use Behavior
Facilitating
Conditions

Age

Gender

Experience

Voluntariness
of Use

Note. From “User acceptance of information technology: Toward a unified view” by V.
Venkatesh, M. Morris, G. Davis, and F. Davis, 2003, MIS Quarterly, 27(3), p. 447.
Copyright 2003 by MIS Quarterly.
Each of the constructs included as antecedents to behavioral intention and use
behavior is actually a combination of constructs derived from the eight extant theories
that were combined into UTAUT. Each of these sub-constructs has its own scale items
and brings predictive value to the constructs as a whole. Performance expectancy is
defined as “the degree to which an individual believes that using the system will help him
or her to attain gains in job performance” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, p. 447). Performance
expectancy is derived from perceived usefulness, taken from TAM/TAM2 and C-TAMTPB; extrinsic motivation, taken from MM; job-fit, taken from MPCU; relative
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advantage, taken from IDT; and outcome expectations from SCT. Effort expectancy is
defined as “the degree of ease associated with the use of the system” (Venkatesh et al.,
2003, p. 450). Effort expectancy is composed of perceived ease of use from TAM/TAM2,
complexity from MPCU, and ease of use from IDT. Social influence is defined as “the
degree to which an individual perceives that important others believe that he or she
should use the new system” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, p. 451). Social influence consists of
the subjective norm from TRA, TAM2, TPB, and C-TAM-TPB; social factors from
MPCU and image from IDT. Facilitating conditions is defined as “the degree to which an
individual believes that an organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support the
use of the system” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, p. 453). Facilitating conditions consists of
perceived behavioral control from TPB and C-TAM-TPB, facilitating conditions from
MPCU, and compatibility from IDT (Venkatesh et al., 2003). In addition, UTAUT
includes a complement of moderating variables including gender, age, and the
moderating constructs of experience and voluntariness of use that were derived from
TAM/TAM2. These moderators are hypothesized to moderate various antecedents
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). In 2012, recognizing that UTAUT possessed limitations in
modeling technology adoption and use by consumers, the aspects of consumer affect,
financial cost and automaticity were incorporated into a second version known as
UTAUT2 (Venkatesh et al., 2012). Three additional constructs (hedonic motivation, price
value and habit) were incorporated into UTAUT2 to more fully capture the variations
between organizational and individual influences affecting technology adoption and use
(Venkatesh et al., 2012). The UTAUT and UTAUT2 models comprised a step forward in
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the study of user acceptance in the IS discipline in both organizational and individual
settings.
In 2008, Venkatesh and Bala introduced the Technology Acceptance Model 3 (TAM3)
(Venkatesh & Bala, 2008). TAM3 introduces the new determinant constructs in two
groups known as “the anchoring and adjustment framing of human decision making”
(Venkatesh & Bala, 2008, p. 278). The anchors represent individual differences in
“general beliefs associated with computers and computer use” (Venkatesh & Bala, 2008,
p. 278). TAM3, in particular, provides a fully developed structure of the determinants left
vague in the original TAM model, as shown in Figure 2. The TAM3 and UTAUT2
models represent the current state of acceptance theory in information systems.
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Figure 2
Technology Acceptance Model 3

Note. From “Technology acceptance model 3 and a research agenda on interventions.” By
V. Venkatesh, and H. Bala, 2008, Decision Sciences, 39(2), 273–315. Copyright 2003 by
Decision Sciences, by permission.

Insider Threat
Significant research has been conducted regarding the implementation and
effectiveness of Internet use policies (Herath & Rao, 2009), Web filtering and other
formal and informal control mechanisms and sanctions (J. Glassman et al., 2015), and
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behavioral and motivational pressures (Willison & Lowry, 2018), all which have
undoubtably decreased misuse of information technology systems (D’Arcy & Devaraj,
2012). However, there is limited research as to what effect these policies have on users
avoiding using provided enterprise information systems in order to more efficiently
access information, leading to what might be referred to as a non-malicious extraorganizational insider threat.
While a seemingly simple term to describe, the term "insider threat" has met with
numerous definitions over the years aiming to categorize and better convey what is meant
by the phrase. At its core, an insider threat consists of two components: access and intent,
but as intent is generally not observable until some action has been taken, the definition
has evolved over the years (Willison & Lowry, 2018). Initially, the term derived its
context from physical protection measures taken by a number of industries, including
banking, accounting, and sales that were more focused on protecting money and property
than less tangible intellectual assets (Brackney & Anderson, 2004). In contrast,
governments have always had an interest in protecting intellectual property from being
lost, stolen, or otherwise exposed. As a result, it is not surprising that the earliest studies
relating to insider threats, including how to bound the definition, were primarily a result
of government-funded research (Baram et al., 2017).
Bishop (2005) proposed the term insider threat be defined as “a trusted entity that is
given the power to violate one or more rules in a given security policy... the insider threat
occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power” (pp.77-78). While this addresses both
access and intent, and is certainly a usable definition, Bishop quickly superseded this
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definition with more expansive language that aimed to differentiate between the specific
actions taken by users with authorized access (Bishop, 2005).
In 2008, Bishop, working with Gates, again addressed the definition of insider threat
in an effort to standardize the terminology to provide increased accuracy and reliability
when evaluating research towards the detection of threats from insiders (Bishop & Gates,
2008). They note that without a consistent definition of the term, each researcher
implicitly expects the reader to comport to a common understanding of the term, but that
these definitions are often influenced by unique experiences, knowledge, assumptions,
and data. Consequently, Bishop and Gates proposed that insider threats are best defined
by the constraints imposed by both access control rules and a security policy: “An insider
can thus be defined with regard to two primitive actions: 1. violation of a security policy
using legitimate access, and 2. violation of an access control policy by obtaining
unauthorized access” (Bishop & Gates, 2008, p. 15:2). Additional studies reinforce the
concept that insider threats are the result of trusted insiders violating access control rules
and policies (Greitzer et al., 2008), whether maliciously or not (Colvin, 2016).
Continuing the theme that access and policy are guiding elements when determining
how to define insider threats, as well as the potentiality of the loss of data, the United
States Department of Defense (DoD) categorizes insider information security incidents as
either infractions or violations (Department of Defense, 2013). DoD Manual 5200.01
defines infractions as “a security incident involving failure to comply with requirements
which cannot reasonably be expected to, and does not, result in the loss, suspected
compromise, or compromise of classified information. An infraction may be
unintentional or inadvertent” (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 86). Security violations
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are more serious and are defined as “security incidents that indicate knowing, willful, and
negligent disregard for security regulations, and result in, or could be expected to result
in, the loss or compromise of classified information” (Department of Defense, 2013, p.
86).
Despite these various definitions, the use of personal information systems to access
publicly available information does not meet the current definitions generally applied to
insider threats, since no explicit policies would be violated nor would access to the
organizations information systems be compromised. One early definition for insider
threats of “malevolent (or possibly inadvertent) actions by an already trusted person with
access to sensitive information” may be appropriate (Brackney & Anderson, 2004, p. xi).
However, the combination of two factors, namely the association of the individual with a
specific organization, such as the U.S. Intelligence Community and specific search terms,
topics or focus used while conducting extra-organizational research could provide
adversaries indications and warning regarding information of interest as well as more
specific actionable information.

Privacy, Trust, and Risk
An employee conducting extra-organizational research is largely relying on a
common, and generally considered unwise, approach to privacy by depending on being
able to hide in the noise and volume of information, also known as “security through
obscurity” (Hartzog & Stutzman, 2013, p. 21). In isolated cases, this approach may make
sense, especially when available identifiers, such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, are
relatively common or change frequently. However, when enough uniquely identifiable
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information elements are present and able to be associated with an individual or an
organization, such as mobile telephone international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)
numbers, hardware addresses, email and physical addresses, phone numbers, and other
identifiers, the scant protections offered by security through obscurity are lost (Hartzog &
Stutzman, 2013; Kehr et al., 2015).
While the concept of privacy has been extensively studied, a universally accepted
understanding of what constitutes privacy has proven to be an elusive quarry (Culnan &
Armstrong, 1999; Solove, 2008). The concept of privacy encompasses many dimensions
and elements, including “the right to be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 193), as
an element of human dignity (Bloustein, 1964), or as Westin described information
privacy, the ability for entities to “determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967, p. 7). Despite
the lack of a common definition or even a single coherent understanding of the concept,
privacy can be described, in a simplified manner, as the absence of intrusion. Similar to
how Justice Potter of the United Supreme Court defined pornography as “I know it when
I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184, 1964, p. 197), an invasion of privacy is readily
apparent to those affected when they are aware it has occurred (Dinev et al., 2013).
Information privacy, as it relates to privacy and the use of technology, is well grounded
by Dinev et al.’s (2013) definition: “an individual’s self-assessed state in which external
[parties] have limited access to information about him or her” (p. 299).
The concept of privacy, sometimes also referred to as trust, has been approached in a
number of ways within the literature, including as a contextual relationship within the
existing UTAUT and TAM models, specifically as part of adoption beliefs such as effort
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expectancy and facilitating conditions (Venkatesh et al., 2011), but generally not as an
independent moderating factor. Other works, such as Dinev et al’s (2015) expanded
Antecedents–Privacy Concerns–Outcomes (APCO) approach recognizes the impact
privacy plays in individuals’ choices, which is not reflected in current technology
acceptance models. There have been a number of studies that focus on incorporating
privacy as a factor within the UTAUT models, generally focusing on the intention to use
specific technologies, such as near-field communication (Morosan & DeFranco, 2016),
social media messaging (Lai & Shi, 2015), and the sharing of user generated content
within social media platforms (Herrero et al., 2017), among others. These studies
generally focus on privacy as a barrier or impediment to the use of existing technology.
Another specific factor that impacts user acceptance of technology as well as privacy
that is generally unique among intelligence professionals is compliance with information
collection processes regarding the collection and use of information created by or about
United States citizens, residents and corporations as codified in United States Presidential
Executive Order 12333 (Executive Orders, 2016). This order directs intelligence activities
of the United States to avoid collecting, retaining or disseminating any information
regarding or identifying any United States person if collected through intelligence
channels. The largest organization that collects intelligence information in the United
States is the Department of Defense, which implements EO 12333 through Department of
Defense Manual 5240.01, which provides procedures governing the conduct of DOD
intelligence activities (Carter, 2016). Within DOD Manual 5240.01, it specifically states
that if information is publicly available regarding United States Persons, there are no
restrictions (Carter, 2016). However, this broad exemption is frequently limited by

29
subordinate organizations (H. Williams & Blum, 2018), and may affect the perception of
risk experienced by members of the study population.
Privacy and risk are increasingly important aspects in understanding the causal and
indirect factors affecting the selection, use, and discontinuation of technology in all its
forms, including hardware, operating systems and applications (Harborth & Pape, 2019;
Ho et al., 2017). A study undertaken by Harborth and Pape (2019) examined what
“…influence have privacy concerns and associated trust and risk beliefs on the behavioral
intention and actual use of Tor?” and “What influence does trust in Tor itself have on the
behavioral intention and the actual use?” (p. 4852), finding that only the degree of trust in
privacy enhancing technologies, in this case the anonymizing network known as Tor,
affected the behavior intention to use the technology. While this study based its research
on the Internet Users Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) model by Malhotra et al.
(2004) as opposed to the TAM3/UTAUT2 models, it used a structural model containing
numerous relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables to analyze the
cause and effect relationship between unobserved latent variables with Partial Least
Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) in an effort to estimate behavioral
intention (Harborth & Pape, 2019). A study by Karwatzki et al. (2018) also examined the
concept of risk and the impact on behavior intention, developing a nomological network
model focusing on the antecedents of privacy experience and familiarity affecting privacy
risks, which is represented by a seven-dimensional construct of the various ways privacy
invasions affect individuals, such as physical, social or psychological effects. This study
used PLS-SEM to empirically assess “how privacy risks influence individuals’
information disclosure and usage intentions” (Karwatzki et al., 2018, p. 12), finding the
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conceptualization of privacy risks as a multidimensional construct incorporating the
various ways an individual could be affected by an invasion of privacy and the impact on
use intention to be well grounded. Other work researching the impact of the awareness of
information security threats on privacy protective behaviors, such as password strength
and non-disclosure of information, which is a suitable proxy for the behavior intention to
use technology, found that while awareness of threats significantly affected both
disclosure and protective measures such as password complexity, privacy self-efficacy
was not positively associated moderating the impact of security threat awareness
(Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2018). Mamonov and Benbunan-Fich’s (2018) study used
PLS-SEM to assess the structural path and relationships between the reflective construct
of the awareness of information security threats and the moderating impact of privacy
self-efficacy on disclosure behavior and password strength selection.
Cloud computing, where data is physically and logically stored in locations not under
the individual (or an organizations) immediate control, introduce further opportunities to
examine the causal effect of perceived risk on both trust and intention to use technology
(Ho et al., 2017). Ho et al. (2017) examined perceived risk and subjective norms within
cloud computing adoption and established a research framework based on the theoretical
foundations found in TAM, but with the modification of intention to use towards
intention to trust as the dependent variable, with the independent variables of knowledge,
attitude and perceived behavioral control with subjective norms and perceived risk as
both independent and moderating variables. This study on the impact of perceived risk
and subjective norms on cloud adoption used PLS-SEM to “identify and explain the
causal relationships between and among the variables” (Ho et al., 2017, p. 32), finding
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that both perceived risk and subjective normal have a significant effect on cloud
computing adoption
The research model for the current study is presented in Figure 3. It is holistically
comprised of constructs derived from Venkatesh et al’s (2003, 2012) Unified Theory of
Acceptance and Use of Technology Versions 1 and 2 and Venkatech and Bala’s (2008)
Technology Acceptance Model Version 3, research on information privacy by Culnan and
Armstrong (1999), Dinev et al. (2013), Kehr (2015), as well as recent work by Dwivedi
et al. (2019) to validate and extend UTAUT’s primary constructs to include the impact
they have on behavioral intention and use behavior. The perception of risk, and its
association with privacy, is a significant factor regarding the use of technology (Dinev et
al., 2013), and impacts the performance expectancy, perceived ease of use and behavioral
intention to use information systems. By incorporating the perception of risk into the
proposed theoretical model, the antecedents found within TAM3 are appropriately
included.
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Figure 3
The Research Model

Hypotheses
The following hypothesis were formulated for this study:
H1a: Perception of risk will have a positive effect on the perceived ease of use of
private Internet access.
H1b: Perception of risk will have a negative effect on the perceived ease of use of
enterprise Internet access.
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H2a: Perception of risk will have a positive effect on the perceived usefulness of
private Internet access.
H2b: Perception of risk will have a negative effect on the perceived usefulness of
enterprise Internet access.

H3a: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the intention
to conduct Internet based research using Private Internet access for OSINT
related work activities.
H3b: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the intention
to conduct Internet based research using Enterprise Internet access for OSINT
related work activities.

H4a: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access positively influences the
perceived usefulness of private Internet access.
H4b: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access positively influences the
perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access.

H5a: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access positively influences employees’
intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work activities.
H5b: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access negatively influences
employees’ intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work
activities.
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H5c: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access negatively influences employees’
intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work activities.
H5d: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access positively influences
employees’ intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work
activities.

H6a: Perceived usefulness of private Internet access positively influences employees’
intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work activities.
H6b: Perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access negatively influences
employees’ intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work
activities.
H6c: Perceived usefulness of private Internet access negatively influences employees’
intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work activities.
H6d: Perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access positively influences
employees’ intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work
activities.

Summary
A comprehensive review of the literature was performed to provide the baseline of
extant knowledge of user acceptance of technology theory, the evolution of those theories
over time, an understanding of how these theories were developed and shaped by shifting
usage patterns of information technology over time, the role insiders have as a threat
vector and the impact trust and risk has on the adoption and use of technology. The
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literature provides numerous examples of the various methods developed over time to
assess both the adoption of technology within organizations and well as by individuals.
The literature establishes that organizational and individual acceptance and use constructs
vary significantly due to both the obligatory nature of institutional requirements as well
as the vagaries of the human condition affecting individual choices. The primary
construct which will be under evaluation in this study, the perception of risk, is
incorporated obliquely in both TAM3 and UTAUT2 through the effort expectancy and
facilitating conditions constructs, but as risk perception becomes increasingly relevant to
the acceptance and use of technology by individual consumers, more research is required
to understand the factors by which these decisions are made. A review of
contemporaneous studies examining the impact of privacy and perceptions of risk on
behavior and use intentions of technology reveals that due to the latent variables inherent
in reflective constructs, the use of Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling
(PLS-SEM) statistical techniques to examine this phenomenon is well grounded in theory
and practice.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

This chapter details the research methodology designed to answer the primary
research question: “What is the relationship between the perception of enterprise risk and
how members of the US Intelligence Community intend to conduct open-source
research?”. This chapter includes a detailed description of the research design, data
collection techniques, instrument development and validation, and data analysis
processes used. A summary is provided to synthesize the overall methodological
approach.

Overview of Research Design
In order to develop empirical support within a modified UTAUT/TAM framework,
this study employed an exploratory research design using survey instruments to collect
quantitative data to examine the impact of the perception of enterprise risk on the
selection and use of private or organizational assets to conduct Open Source Intelligence
research. A quantitative approach allowed this study to minimize the effects of bias that
may affect the hypotheses through statistical analysis techniques (Plonsky & Gass, 2011).
The use of a structural path model based on fundamental theory and described in Figure
3, which specify how the latent variables are related to one another as well as the impact
on the dependent variable, will provide the opportunity to estimate complex cause and
effect relationships (Hair et al., 2017).
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The research was conducted in three phases. During the first phase, the survey
instrument was developed following a comprehensive review of literature and construct
validity and reliability validated against a panel of nine experts recruited from academia,
industry and government agencies specializing in information security, cybersecurity and
related disciples. The titles, professional associations, areas of concentration, years of
experience, and the gender of the Delphi panel members are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
Delphi Panel Characteristics
Title

Professional
Area

Area of Concentration

Years of
Experience

Gender

Professor
Professor
Director
Professor
Intel Officer
Researcher
Professor
Professor
Director

Academia
Academia
Industry
Academia
Government
Academia
Academia
Academia
Industry

Information Systems
Information Systems
Open-Source Research/Training
Information Systems
Cyber Threat Analysis
Information Security
Information Systems
Information Security
Cybersecurity

15+
20+
20+
10+
20+
20+
15+
15+
30+

Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male

The survey instrument was refined based on feedback from the Delphi panel and
validated scales from previous studies, which according to Hair et al.(2010) is consistent
with established best practices. A pre-test was used to increase confidence and ensure
respondents understand the survey questions (Oksenberg & Kalton, 1991) and were
examined to minimize issues related to instrument validity, including content and
construct validity as well as reliability as identified by Straub (1989). Ex ante power
analysis was conducted prior to the data collection to ensure adequate statistical power
(Aguirre-Urreta & Rönkkö, 2015). In the final phase, following the development of the
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survey instrument and validation, an online survey was provided to members of the
United States Intelligence Community through a variety of platforms, receiving 240 valid
responses. This survey and invitations to participate were approved for posting on US
government systems, which increased the quality and quantity of responses.
The study population, the United States Intelligence Community that conducts
analysis and uses Open Source Intelligence, is small enough (IC EEO, 2019) that the
population is likely to not be normally distributed and it is unlikely that obtaining sample
sizes necessary for confirmatory analysis processes used in covariance based statistical
analysis would have been possible. Based on the size of the samples from the study
population, the character of the structural path model and the exploratory nature of this
proposed research, analysis was conducted through the use of Partial Least Squares
Structured Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) (Hair et al., 2010, 2017; Mamonov &
Benbunan-Fich, 2018). The use of PLS-SEM is widely recognized as a valid method in
both the information systems and business disciplines and is best used on small sample
sizes when developing and evaluating theories (Hair et al., 2010, 2019; Khan et al.,
2019).
Instrument Development
For the dependent variables of the intention to use privately or enterprise owned
Internet access to conduct open-source research, the measure introduced by Brown and
Venkatesh (2005) was adopted. Davis’s (1989) measures regarding ease of use and
usefulness were adjusted to the context of private Internet access devices and enterprise
provided Internet access, with the constructs referring to completing Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT) work tasks involving the use of the Internet, allowing for

39
comparison. The perception of risk measures were adapted from Lee’s (2009) measures
of performance and security risks and the facilitating conditions measures were adapted
from Hong et al.’s (2011) measures facilitating conditions in the acceptance of agile
information systems. The measures for facilitating conditions and perception of risk for
privately owned devices and Internet were not incorporated into the research model. The
instrument also collected Diener et al.’s (1985) “Satisfaction With Life Scale” as a marker
variable to implement the partial correlation procedure in the event common method bias
was indicated (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All measures were assessed using a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from completely agree to completely disagree, except one excluded
indicator which included a binary choice between the intention to use enterprise or
private Internet. Table 2 shows an overview of the measurement instruments that were
used.
Table 2
Overview of the Measurement Instruments
Perception of
Risk (Enterprise)

POR1: I would not feel safe using my work provided devices and Internet
to do open source research.
POR2: I’m worried that using my work provided devices and Internet to
research work topics could cause me problems.
POR3: I would not feel secure using my work provided devices and
Internet to research publicly available websites from other countries.

(M.-C. Lee,
2009)

Perceived Ease of
Use

If I used [enterprise provided Internet access / my own Internet access at
home] for work related Internet research…

(Davis et
al., 1989)

[of private
Internet /
enterprise
Internet]

PE [E/P] 1:…learning how to operate the Internet browser would be easy
for me.
PE [E/P] 2:…I would find it easy to find the information I was looking for.
PE [E/P] 3:…my interaction with the applications would be clear, effective
and flexible.
PE [E/P] 4:…it would be easy for me to become skilled at open source
research.
PE [E/P] 5:…I would find that the tools I need are easy to use.

(PoRE)

(PEUPI/PEUEI)
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Perceived
Usefulness

Using [enterprise provided Internet access / my own Internet access at
home] for work related Internet research…

[of private
Internet /
enterprise
Internet]

PU [E/P] 1:…would enable me to accomplish Internet research more
quickly.
PU [E/P] 2:…would improve my job performance.
PU [E/P] 3:…would increase my productivity.
PU [E/P] 4:…would enhance my effectiveness.
PU [E/P] 5:…would make it easier to do my job.
PU [E/P] 6: I would find using my own Internet access at home /at work
useful to do work related Internet research.

(PUPI/PUEI)

(Davis et
al., 1989)

Intention to Use
[of private
Internet /
enterprise
Internet]
for Work
Activities.

PIAW1: I intend to use my [enterprise/personal] Internet access to do
Open Source research within the next two months.
PIAW2: I predict that I will use my [enterprise/personal] Internet access
for Open Source research in the next two months.
PIAW3: I expect that I will use my [enterprise/personal] Internet access
for work in the next two months.
PIAW4: Within the next two months, I am likely to use my
[enterprise/personal] Internet access to do work.

(S. A.
Brown &
Venkatesh,
2005)

Facilitating
Conditions

FC1: I have the technical resources to use [enterprise provided/personal]
open source Internet research tools on the Internet.
FC2: I have the knowledge necessary to use [enterprise provided/personal]
open source Internet research tools on the Internet.

(Hong et
al., 2011)

Validity and Reliability
The measurement items have been selected from previously validated studies, with
most slightly modified to suit the information assurance nature of this inquiry, which
provides fidelity of measurement (Mowbray et al., 2003). The survey instrument was
tested to ensure it meets acceptable levels of validity and reliability, as well as
comparisons to previously validated measurements. The model was evaluated using
convergent validity, collinearity between indicators and the significance and relevance of
outer weights (Hair et al., 2017). Additionally, the structural model was evaluated using
the coefficients of determination (R2), predictive relevance (Q2), the size and significance
of path coefficients, as well as f2 effect sizes (Hair et al., 2017, 2019).
Validity
Salkind (2011) described internal validity as “the quality of an experimental design
such that the results obtained can be attributed to the manipulation of the independent
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variable, whereas external validity is the quality of an experimental design such that the
results can be generalized from the original sample and by extension, to the population
from which the sample originated” (p. 148-149), while Gay and Airasian (2003)
described validity as “the degree to which a survey measures what it is supposed to
measure” (p. 23). Instrument validation is defined by Straub (1989) as the “prior and
primary process in confirmatory empirical research” (p. 162). Together, these efforts
describe the effect of validity on the quality of research and the generalizability of the
results.
Reliability
Reliability relates to the degree in which the results of a study can be replicated, i.e.
different researchers are able to reach the same or similar result (Carmines & Zeller,
1979). One measure of reliability found in the literature and widely used is Cronbach’s α,
which is used to determine the internal consistency and provides a summary measure
based on the correlation of a given scale (Cronbach, 1951). As a result of Cronbach’s α
being readily discernable, and easily understood, it has been adopted as the prevailing
method to determine reliability. More recent studies have called for the abandonment of
this measure in favor of more dynamic analysis such as convergent reliability (Bonett &
Wright, 2015; Hair et al., 2017), with studies indicating that “Cronbach’s alpha is both
unrelated to a scale's internal consistency and a fatally flawed estimate of its reliability”
(Peters, 2018, p. 56). In addition to Cronbach’s α, this study examined content validity
before collecting data, and following data collection, convergent validity, the significance
and relevance of indicator weights, and the presence of collinearity amongst indicators to
measure and assess the measurement model.
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Data Collection
Initial data collection focused on a Delphi panel of nine experts recruited from
academia, industry and government agencies specializing in information security,
cybersecurity and related disciplines, with the intent to form a consensus of the study’s
content, face validity, and reliability, with multiple iterative rounds necessary to achieve
consensus. When there is a clear basis in literature from which to establish the survey
instrument, a two round Delphi is often suitable, but additional iterations were necessary
to resolve concerns (Dalkey et al., 1970). According to Akins et al. (2005), a Delphi panel
consisting of a relatively small number of experts achieves reliable outcomes when strict
inclusion methods are employed. The Delphi method is generally considered a quick,
inexpensive, and relatively efficient method to ensure consensus regarding a topic or
process that require individual judgements (Powell, 2003).
The Delphi group was provided the proposed survey instrument through the online
Google Forms tool, which provided the opportunity to solicit qualitative responses,
allowing for anonymous but secure participation and discussion within the Delphi group,
both between the researcher and other participants, which is an established best practice
(Akins et al., 2005). The Delphi panel identified several questions relating to perception
of risk which were inadvertently reverse coded, e.g. “I would feel safe...” as opposed to
“I would not feel safe…” and were subsequently corrected. The Delphi panel discussed
the potential for social desirability to influence to the results, but ultimately decided that
the anonymity protections provided sufficient mitigation of these concerns. Several
survey and demographic questions were reworded to add clarity, remove ambiguity or
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were identified as being unnecessary as was the case in several demographic questions
adopted from other survey instruments, including respondent’s sexual preference.
Upon completion of the Delphi panel, the survey was provided through secure
government information system enclaves to members of the United States Intelligence
Community who use open-source intelligence as part of their work functions. Due to the
nature of the secure government information system enclaves, the study population is
isolated, ensuring population integrity. Survey responses, along with appropriate
demographic information, was collected through the use of Typeform, an online survey
tool which provides a secure, customizable, and easily accessible data collection process,
as well as a mirror of the survey hosted by Sharepoint available with each government
enclave (Security at Typeform, 2020). All data collected were anonymized, password
protected and secured with multi-factor authentication to ensure the confidentiality and
integrity of the responses and to ensure only study personnel had access.
Population and Sample
This study population was limited to members of the US intelligence community. The
sample included staff, contractors, as well as military members. For the purposes of this
study, members of the United States Intelligence Community are defined as individuals
employed, assigned, attached or working on behalf of any of the 17 separate United
States government intelligence agencies that conduct intelligence activities in support of
the national security of the United States (Richelson, 2018). The United States
Intelligence Community consists of entities that encompass a broad range of
specializations and missions, broadly categorized into national intelligence (Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office,
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National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), defense and military intelligence (Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the service specific intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marines and Coast Guard) and civilian intelligence agencies (Department of State,
Department of Energy, Department of Treasury, Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency) (Richelson, 2018).
Sample Size
According to Hair et al. (2017), a recommended sample size of 26 observations would
be needed to arrive at a statistical power of 80% for observing R 2 value of at least 0.50,
accounting for a 1% error probability, based on 5 independent variables. The R2 values
reported in the studies used to develop the instrument were identified to determine the
minimum values for endogenous constructs to calculate the appropriate sample size.
Brown and Venkatesh (2005) reported an adjusted R2 value of .74, Davis (1989) reported
an adjusted R2 value of .79, Lee (2009) reported an adjusted R2 value of .80 and Hong et
al. Hong (2011) reported an R2 value of .51.
Another method for determining sample size within PLS-SEM is known as the 10
times rule, which indicates that the sample should be the larger of 10 times the largest
number of formative indicators used to measure a single construct or 10 times the largest
number of structural paths directed towards a particular construct in the structural model
(Barclay et al., 1995; Chin & Newsted, 1999). Applying this rule of thumb to the research
model results in 50 (10 x 5 reflective indicators) samples needed to adequately provide
statistical power and confidence.
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Data Analysis
Data analysis of the Delphi panel consisted of an examination of the responses to the
initial round of semi-open questions regarding the proposed structural and measurement
model as well as the survey instrument and three rounds of structured questions to verify
previous consensus and finalize the model and survey instrument (Brady, 2015). Data
analysis of the survey instrument was initially used to ensure the suitability of the data
collected, with an emphasis on non-response bias and common method bias (Chin et al.,
2012; MacKenzie et al., 2011) as well as obvious data integrity issues such as patterning,
straight lining and missing data. Partial Least Squares Structured Equation Modeling
(PLS-SEM) is an accepted method within IS research and is an appropriate method to be
used for the analysis due to the theoretical nature of the study as well as the conceptual
model (Hair et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2019). Analysis consisted of an examination of the
measurement models to ensure suitability of the constructs and an evaluation of the
structural model as proposed by the hypothesis of this study (Gefen et al., 2011; Hair et
al., 2010).
Resources
This research study required the following resources:


Expert panel for Delphi Method: Phase 1 of the research required an expert
panel of nine cybersecurity and information systems Subject Matter Experts
with diverse backgrounds and expertise within the field, as well as varying in
age and education.



Google Forms: A Web-based tool was used to gather expert panel input.
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Access to employee population: Approval from the IRB at Nova Southeastern
University was obtained and is shown in Appendix A.



Typeform: This is a multiplatform and versatile online data collection tool,
which will be used to collect surveys.



Microsoft Sharepoint: A web-based collaborative platform that was used to
host a mirror of the survey on U.S. government systems.



Microsoft Excel: A spreadsheet application used to compile and present
sample demographics.



Statistical analysis tool: Following data collection, SmartPLS Version 3.3.3,
was used to conduct PLS-SEM analysis of the data and GNU PSPP Version
1.4.1-g79ad47 was used to conduct factor analysis.

Summary
This chapter consists of an overview of the quantitative research design and
methodology. The research design is an exploratory model developing theory, based on
established literature. The population is described as members of the United States
Intelligence Community that uses Open Source Intelligence as part of their work, located
throughout the world. The size of the study population is not publicly disclosed, but the
response rate of 240 valid responses exceeds the minimum of 50 valid survey responses
needed to provide sufficient statistical power (Hair et al., 2017) for analysis. Data were
collected was obtained through the use of online tools and Web-based survey instruments.
Collected data were analyzed through the use of SmartPLS Version 3.3.3, a statistical
analysis toolset used to conduct PLS-SEM, and GNU PSPP Version 1.4.1 for factor
analysis.
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Chapter 4
Results
Overview
This chapter provides the results of a quantitative analysis of the data, as well as the
demographics of the responses and the sample population. Analysis was performed on a
sample of 240 cases from the data, reduced from 243 cases due to missed attention check
indicators. The first section provides a demographic overview of the respondents. The
subsequent sections detail the quantitative analysis of the data, consistent with the
process for assessing PLS-SEM data identified by Hair et al. (2017). Beginning with the
assessment of the measurement model, reflective constructs were assessed for convergent
and discriminant validity as well as internal consistency. The measurement model was
also assessed for common method bias. The structural model was then assessed for effect
size and significance, followed by an assessment of the explanatory power and predictive
relevance of the model. These analytical results are presented, followed by the results of
the hypotheses of this study.
The quantitative results of the study were developed using SmartPLS version 3.3.3
(Ringle et al., 2015) for PLS-SEM analysis, and GNU PSPP Version 1.4.1 (GNU Project,
2020) was used to conduct the Harmon one-factor test for common method variance. The
consistent PLS (PLSc) algorithm, with all latent variables connected to ensure consistent
results, was used for PLS-SEM analysis as well as PLS bootstrapping, as recommend
when the research model contains all reflective constructs (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015;
Hair et al., 2017; Ringle et al., 2015). The PLSc algorithm ensures consistent results with
a factor-model by making corrections of reflective constructs’ correlations (Dijkstra,
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2014; Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015; Dijkstra & Schermelleh-Engel, 2014). The sample
demographics were assembled using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Excel, 2020)

Sample Demographics
The details of the survey responses are listed in Table 3, including the number of
surveys started, the number of surveys in which the participant declined to continue or
did not meet the inclusion criteria, as well as those rejected due to a missed attention
check question. Due to the design of the survey software, missing or incomplete data
were included in the dropout/declined numbers. The remainder of the usable responses
were examined for data integrity issues such as patterning or straight lining, with no
issues found.
Table 3
Response Rate Details
Surveys Started
Dropouts/Declined
Completed responses
Rejected due to missed attention check
Usable responses

Count
272
29
243
3
240

Percentage
100%
10.66%
89.34%
1.10%
88.24%

Table 4 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified gender.
The responses indicate a fairly equitable distribution of both the IC population and the
population at large.
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Table 4
Participant Gender (N=240)
Gender
Count
Percentage
Female
105
43.8%
Male
134
55.8%
Other
1
0.4%
Table 5 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified age
category. The responses indicate a normal distribution of participants.
Table 5
Participant Age (N=240)
Age
Count
18-24
16
25-34
49
35-44
83
45-54
61
55-64
20
65+
11

Percentage
6.7%
20.4%
34.6%
25.4%
8.3%
4.6%

Table 6 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified ethnicity.
The responses indicate a moderate bias towards those identifying as White or Caucasian,
comprising of 72.5% of respondents, followed by those identifying as Black or African
American with 9.2%.
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Table 6
Participant Ethnicity (N=240)
Ethnicity
Asian or Pacific Islander
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Native American or American Indian
Other
White or Caucasian

Count Percentage
14
5.8%
22
9.2%
15
6.3%
4
1.7%
11
4.6%
174
72.5%

Table 7 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified length of
service in the Intelligence Community. Approximately half (48.8%) of the respondents
have served in the IC for 1-10 years, about one-third (27.9%) have served 11-20 years
and 23.3% have served for more than 20 years.
Table 7
Participant Length of Service (N=240)
Length of IC Service
Count Percentage
1 to 3 years
28
11.7%
4 to 5 years
46
19.2%
6 to 10 years
43
17.9%
11 to 20 years
67
27.9%
More than 20 years
56
23.3%
Table 8 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified levels of
education attainment. It should be noted that the majority of civilian positions within the
IC require a minimum education level, usually a Bachelor’s degree (Career Fields |
Intelligence Careers, 2020). Some military and contractor positions do not have these
requirements.
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Table 8
Participant Education (N=240)
Education
High School Diploma/GED or equivalent
Associate Degree (e.g., AA, AS)
Bachelor's Degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Master's Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)
Professional Degree (e.g., MD, DDS, JD)
Doctorate Degree (e.g., PhD, EdD)

Count
9
5
102
117
1
6

Percentage
3.8%
2.1%
42.5%
48.8%
0.4%
2.5%

Table 9 identifies number and percentage of the respondents’ self-identified seniority,
as identified by categorized pay grade or rank, within the IC. Government Service (GS)
grades range between 1 and 15, with higher grades indicating increased responsibility and
pay, followed by executive level positions including Senior Executive Service (SES) and
Defense Intelligence Senior Leader (DISL) (US Office of Personnel Management, 2009).
Military grades range from E-1 to E-9 for enlisted personnel and O-1 to O-10 for officer
personnel. Contractor personnel do not have assigned grades, but work under the
supervision of government employees, with a de facto grade one less than the supervising
employee.
Table 9
Participant Seniority (N=240)
Pay Grade or Rank
GS 1-5 or E1 to E4 (MIL)
GS 6-9 or E5 to E7 (MIL)
GS 10-12 or E8-O2 (MIL)
GS 13-14 or O3 - O4 (MIL)
GS 15 or O5-O6 (MIL)
SES/DISL/General Officer

Count
3
25
51
130
28
3

Percentage
1.3%
10.4%
21.3%
54.2%
11.7%
1.3%
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Measurement Model Analysis
Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity of Reflective Constructs
This study reports both Cronbach’s α and composite reliability score in the evaluation
of the internal consistency for the reflective constructs. Cronbach’s α has been
traditionally used as the primary method of assessing internal consistency and reliability,
with scores greater than 0.7 indicating reliability of the measured construct (Bonett &
Wright, 2015; Hair et al., 2017) but as discussed in Chapter 3, the relevance of
Cronbach’s α has been questioned (Peters, 2018). Composite reliability is a preferred
measure for internal consistency when using PLS-SEM analysis, wherein scores above
0.7 indicate reliability and scores above 0.9 indicate possible multicollinearity within the
construct (Hair et al., 2017). The requirement that the dimensions of reflective constructs
be related, or convergent validity, are assessed in this study through average variance
extracted (AVE), with scores greater than 0.5 indicating support. All of the scores for
Cronbach’s α, composite reliability and AVE indicate internal consistency and convergent
validity, respectively, of the reflective constructs and are shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Composite and Convergent Validity (N=240)

Construct
Intention to Use Enterprise
Intention to Use Private
PEUEI
PEUPI
PUEI
PUPI
PoRE

Cronbach's α
0.770
0.801
0.864
0.863
0.865
0.887
0.832

Composite
Reliability
0.769
0.803
0.868
0.865
0.864
0.886
0.839

Average
Variance
Extracted
(AVE)
0.528
0.577
0.580
0.567
0.516
0.566
0.642
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Discriminant Validity of Reflective Constructs
Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio is a measure of discriminant validity to determine
if the constructs of a reflective model are empirically distinct from each other, and is
recommended as a robust measure of discriminant validity (Ab Hamid et al., 2017),
especially when conducting PLS-SEM analysis (Hair et al., 2017). Generally, HTMT
ratios should not exceed 0.85, or 0.9 if the reflective constructs are closely related (Hair
et al., 2017; Henseler et al., 2015). None of the HTMT ratios reported in Table 11 exceed
the recommended cutoff of 0.85.
Table 11
Hetrotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) (N=240)

Intention to Use Private
PEUEI
PEUPI
PUEI
PUPI
PoRE

Intention to
Use
Enterprise
0.498
0.106
0.466
0.164
0.390
0.641

Intention
to Use
Private
0.116
0.567
0.107
0.699
0.445

PEUEI PEUPI PUEI PUPI PoRE

0.158
0.560
0.208
0.120

0.275
0.658
0.379

0.330
0.125 0.326

Common Method Variance
Common method variance (CMV) is defined by Richardson et al. (2009, p. 763) as the
“systematic error variance shared among variables measured with and introduced as a
function of the same method and/or source”, and is a potential source of bias when the
same respondent provides both independent and dependent data collected on the same
instrument, a common trait of survey based research (Eichhorn, 2014). In significant
levels, this variance can lead to common method bias (CMB), indicating the design of the
survey instrument unduly affects the responses and which would call into question the
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validity of the study. One useful measure to identify disproportionate CMV is Harman’s
One-Factor Test, also known as Harmon’s Single-Factor Test, which identifies the
variance explained by a single factor, including all indicators within the model and if the
variance is <50%, excessive CMV does not exist (Tehseen et al., 2017). As shown in
Table 12, 27.50% of the variance is explained by one factor, well below the threshold of
>50% which would indicate CMB and threaten the validity of the study.
Table 12
Harmon's One-Factor Test
Component
1.00

Total
28.27

% of Variance
27.50%

Cumulative
Variance %
27.50%

Structural Model Analysis
Following the validation of the measurement model, the structural model is assessed,
beginning with the evaluation of the statistical significance of the diverse paths of the
model. The effect size of each path coefficient, which estimates how one construct
contributes to the explanatory power of other constructs, represented using the f2
measure, is then reported (Cohen, 1992; Hair et al., 2017). Next, the size and significance
of each endogenous construct is evaluated using the R 2 coefficient of determination and
the predictive relevance of the endogenous constructs evaluated using the Q 2 measure.
The final section evaluates the theorized hypotheses of this study and accepts or rejects
the hypotheses based on the analysis of the structural model. The results of the PLS-SEM
analysis are displayed in Figure 4, which shows the composite reliability of the constructs
and the path coefficients.
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Figure 4
PLS-SEM Analysis Results

56
Path Model Coefficient Significance and Effect Size
The initial evaluation of the statistical significance of the diverse paths of the model
was conducted using an analysis of the variance inflation factors (VIF), which assesses
collinearity (Hair et al., 2017). Constructs with high collinearity, as shown by VIF values
exceeding five, indicate significant correlation between multiple predictor variables as
well as redundancy (Hair et al., 2017). As shown in Table 13, the path model VIF values
fall well below the threshold of 5, indicating a lack of collinearity between constructs.
Table 13
Path Model Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
Intention to
Intention to
Use Enterprise Use Private PEUEI PEUPI PUEI PUPI PoRE
PEUEI
1.635
1.635
1.018
PEUPI
2.045
2.045
1.177
PUEI
1.690
1.690
PUPI
1.929
1.929
PoRE
1.225
1.225
1.000
1.000 1.018 1.177
Path model coefficients (β) were evaluated, which represent the hypothesized
relationships between and among the constructs and range from -1 to 1 (Hair et al., 2017).
Effect sizes (f2) are also assessed, as they provide a method of determining the impact an
exogenous construct has on endogenous constructs. According to Cohen (1992),
assessing effect sizes (f2 ) should follow these guidelines: values <0.02 indicate no effect;
values between 0.02 and <0.15 represent a small effect; values between 0.15 and <0.35
represent a medium effect and values of 0.35 of greater indicate a large effect on the
exogenous latent variables.
Statistical significance was further evaluated following the PLS-SEM bootstrapping
process. Bootstrapping is a process where subsamples of the data are analyzed to
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determine significance as PLS-SEM is a non-parametric statistical method wherein there
is no assumption that the underlying data are statistically distributed (Hair et al., 2017).
Bootstrapping was calculated using the SmartPLS consistent PLS (PLSc) method with
maximum iterations, complete bootstrapping complexity, Bias-Corrected and Accelerated
(BCa) bootstrap as the confidence interval method, using 5000 samples with a two tailed
test type at a 0.05 significance level, consistent with recommendations by Hair et al.
(2017). The bootstrapping process provided a calculation of the t values, which were
assessed using a two-tailed basis due to the non-directional nature of hypotheses within
this study, allowing for an evaluation of the significance levels. Critical values for twotailed t values at a 90% significance level are 1.645, 95% significance level is 1.96 and at
a 99% significance level, 2.57 (Hair et al., 2017). Path model coefficients (β), two-tailed t
values, effect sizes (f2) and the corresponding p values are displayed in Table 14.
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Table 14
Path Model Coefficients (N=240)
Inner Path Model
PEUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PEUEI -> Intention to Use Private
PEUEI -> PUEI
PEUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PEUPI -> Intention to Use Private
PEUPI -> PUPI
PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PUEI -> Intention to Use Private
PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PUPI -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> PEUEI
PoRE -> PEUPI
PoRE -> PUEI
PoRE -> PUPI

β
-0.033
-0.037
0.569
-0.234
0.151
0.619
0.039
0.194
-0.048
0.595
-0.525
0.194
-0.133
0.388
-0.031
0.102

t Values
0.362
0.457
10.319
2.204
1.494
9.309
0.312
2.156
0.418
6.780
6.338
2.849
1.731
5.546
0.477
1.545

f2
0.001
0.002
0.474+++
0.050+
0.027+
0.584+++
0.002
0.053+
0.002
0.435+++
0.423+++
0.073+
0.018
0.177++
0.001
0.016

p Values
0.718
0.648
<0.001***
0.028*
0.135
<0.001***
0.755
0.031**
0.676
<0.001***
<0.001***
0.004***
0.084
<0.001***
0.634
0.123

Note. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 f2 effect size +Small ++Medium +++Large
Path model coefficients (β), representing the path effect of linked constructs, provides
an estimation of the relationship between a dependent and independent variable, wherein
for every standard deviation change in the independent variable, the dependent variable
will change by the path coefficient (β) standard deviations (Hair et al., 2017). The
relationships between constructs with the highest positive β were PEUPI-PUPI (0.619),
PUPI-Intention to Use Private (0.595), PEUEI-PUEI (0.569), PoRE-PEUPI (0.388) and
PUEI-Intention to Use Private (0.194). The path relationships with the largest negative β
were PoRE-Intention to Use Enterprise (-0.525) and PEUPI-Intention to Use Enterprise
(-0.234). The path models of PEUPI-PUPI, PUPI-Intention to Use Private, PEUEI-PUEI
and PoRE-Intention to Use Enterprise each have a large effect size and a p value <0.001.
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PoRE-PEUPI has a medium effect size and a p value <0.001 while PEUPI-Intention to
Use Enterprise has a small effect size and a p value <.10.
Specific indirect effects, which evaluate the β on constructs through at least one
additional mediating construct and estimate the relevance of significant relationships
(Hair et al., 2017), were analyzed using SmartPLS software and is shown in Table 15.
The most significant effect paths were PEUPI-PUPI-Intention to Use Private (0.368),
PoRE-PEUPI-PUPI (0.240), PoRE-PEUPI-PUPI-Intention to Use Private (0.143) and
PEUEI-PUEI-Intention to Use Private (0.111).
Table 15
Path Model Specific Indirect Effects (N=240)
Path
PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> PEUPI -> PUPI
PoRE -> PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Private
PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> PEUPI -> Intention to Use Private
PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PEUEI -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> PEUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Private
PoRE -> PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PEUEI -> PUEI -> Intention to Use Private
PEUPI -> PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
PoRE -> PEUEI -> PUEI
PoRE -> PEUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise

Specific Indirect
Effects
0.368
0.240
0.143
0.111
0.061
0.059
0.022
0.005
0.004
-0.001
-0.003
-0.005
-0.006
-0.011
-0.015
-0.030
-0.076
-0.091
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Total effects, the sum of direct and indirect effects, represent both the direct effect of
one construct on another as well as the indirect effects of mediating constructs (Hair et
al., 2017; Sarstedt et al., 2019) and is shown in Table 16.
Table 16
Path Model Total Effects
Intention Intention
to Use
to Use
Enterprise Private
PEUEI
-0.011
0.073
PEUPI
-0.264
0.520
PUEI
0.039
0.194
PUPI
-0.048
0.595
PoRE
-0.632
0.441

PEUEI

PEUPI

PUEI
0.569

PUPI

PoRE

0.619

-0.133

0.388

-0.107

0.342

Explanatory Power and Predictive Relevance
Within this study, two endogenous constructs existed: Intention to Use Private
[Internet] and Intention to Use Enterprise [Internet]. The quality of the structural model
was assessed to identify the explanatory power and predictive relevance of these
endogenous constructs and is detailed in Table 17. Predictive power is calculated as the
coefficient of determination (R2), which is the “squared correlation between a specific
endogenous construct’s actual and predicted values” (Hair et al., 2017, p. 198), which is
an in-sample prediction. To avoid bias towards more complex models, an adjusted
coefficient of determination is used, where the exogenous constructs relative to the
sample size are adjusted, systematically compensating for nonsignificant exogenous
constructs which would otherwise increase explained variance (Hair et al., 2017). For
both R2 and Adjusted R2, values range from 0 to 1, with increasing values indicating
increasing predictive relevance. R2 values for endogenous constructs are generally
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identified as substantial with values of 0.75, moderate with values of 0.5 and weak with
values of 0.25 (Hair et al., 2017, 2019).
Out-of-sample predictive power, or predictive relevance, is assessed through StoneGeisser’s Q2 value, which predicts data not found within the model estimation (Geisser,
1974; Hair et al., 2017; Stone, 1974). Q2 values are developed using a blindfolding
technique where data points in the endogenous constructs are systematically and
iteratively removed and the remaining data are used to predict the missing data; the true
values are then compared to the predicted values to develop the Q 2 measure (Hair et al.,
2017). Q2 values that exceed 0 are considered to have some predictive relevance, with
values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 representing small, medium and large predictive relevance
for reflective endogenous constructs (Hair et al., 2017).
Table 17
Explanatory Power and Predictive Relevance
R2
Intention to Use Enterprise 0.467***
Intention to Use Private
0.578***
Note. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Adjusted R2
0.498***
0.598***

Q2
0.207
0.295

The structural model in this study provides a weak coefficient of determination (R 2)
for the endogenous construct Intention to Use Enterprise (0.467) and a moderate
coefficient of determination for Intention to Use Private (0.578), both of which are
statistically significant at p<0.01. Both constructs have medium predictive value with Q 2
scores of 0.207 and 0.295, respectively.
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Hypothesized Relationships
The results of the hypothesized relationships of the research model are presented in
this section. The hypotheses, associated predictor paths, path coefficient (β), significance
(t value and associated p values) and the result of the hypotheses are show in Table 18.
Structural paths not associated with hypotheses are not displayed and will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
Table 18
Hypotheses Results (N=240)
Label Predictor
H1a
PoRE -> PEUPI
H1b PoRE -> PEUEI
H2a
PoRE -> PUPI
H2b PoRE -> PUEI
H3a
PoRE -> Intention to Use Private
H3b PoRE -> Intention to Use Enterprise
H4a
PEUPI -> PUPI
H4b PEUEI -> PUEI
H5a
PEUPI -> Intention to Use Private
H5b PEUEI -> Intention to Use Private
H5c
PEUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
H5d PEUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
H6a
PUPI -> Intention to Use Private
H6b PUEI -> Intention to Use Private
H6c
PUPI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
H6d PUEI -> Intention to Use Enterprise
Note. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

β
t Values p Values
Result
0.388
5.546 <0.001*** Supported
-0.133
1.731
0.084 Not Supported
0.102
1.545
0.123 Not Supported
-0.031
0.477
0.634 Not Supported
0.194
2.849 0.004*** Supported
-0.525
6.338 <0.001*** Supported
0.619
9.309 <0.001*** Supported
0.569
10.319 <0.001*** Supported
0.151
1.494
0.135 Not Supported
-0.037
0.457
0.648 Not Supported
-0.234
2.204
0.028** Supported
-0.033
0.362
0.718 Not Supported
0.595
6.780 <0.001*** Supported
0.194
2.156
0.031** Not Supported
-0.048
0.418
0.676 Not Supported
0.039
0.312
0.755 Not Supported

The majority of theorized hypotheses were not supported for lack of statistical
significance, including: H1b, H2a, H3b, H5a, H5b, H5d, H6c and H6d. Hypothesis 6b:
“Perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access negatively influences employees’
intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work activities” is not
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supported because while it is statistically significant, the path coefficient indicates a
positive effect, contrary to the hypothesis.
The following seven hypotheses were supported and are displayed in Figure 5:
H1a: Perception of risk will have a positive effect on the perceived ease of use of
private Internet access.
H3a: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the
intention to conduct Internet based research using Private Internet access for OSINT
related work activities.
H3b: The perception of enterprise risk will have a direct relationship with the
intention to conduct Internet based research using Enterprise Internet access for
OSINT related work activities.
H4a: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access positively influences the
perceived usefulness of private Internet access.
H4b: Perceived ease of use of enterprise Internet access positively influences the
perceived usefulness of enterprise Internet access.
H5c: Perceived ease of use of private Internet access negatively influences
employees’ intention to use Enterprise Internet access for OSINT related work
activities.
H6a: Perceived usefulness of private Internet access positively influences employees’
intention to use private Internet access for OSINT related work activities.
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Figure 5
Hypothesis Results
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Summary
The goal of this study was to empirically assess the effects perception of risk of using
enterprise provided Internet access has on the ease of use and usefulness of both private
and enterprise Internet access, and the intention to use private or enterprise systems for
OSINT related work activities. To accomplish this, participants completed a survey. This
chapter provides the results of the quantitative analysis of the demographics of the
responses and the study population, the measurement and structural models, and the
results of the hypotheses. The data were analyzed using SmartPLS software to conduct
PLS-SEM analysis and GNU PSPP software to assess for the presence of common
method bias, which provided measures that confirmed the validity and reliability of the
measurement and structural model, as well as the significance and effects of path
coefficients in the model. Based on these analyses, seven hypotheses were supported and
nine were not supported.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Overview
This chapter includes conclusions drawn from the findings of the analytical results
provided in Chapter 4, in light of the literature reviewed, followed by discussion of the
study’s limitations, strengths and weaknesses. Next, implications of the research on
organizational Internet restrictions and usage are discussed. The final sections of this
chapter focus on recommendations for future research opportunities and a summary.

Conclusions
The goal of this research was to assess the influence the perception of risk has on the
behavioral intention and use behavior of personally-owned Internet devices and access to
conduct open-source research among members of the United States Intelligence
Community. Based on the results of this study, the perception of risk when using
enterprise provided Internet devices and access has a significant negative impact on the
intention of using enterprise provided devices (H3b: β=-0.525, p<0.001, f2 >0.35).
Inversely, the perception of risk when using enterprise provided Internet devices and
access on the intention to use private devices was less robust, but with a positive effect
(H3a: β=0.194, p<0.01, f2 >0.02). These results comport well to Lee’s (2009) prior work
evaluating the impact of risk on intention to use and support the proposition of the study
that as risk increases with the use of enterprise resources, individuals are more likely to
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use their own Internet and devices to conduct work related tasks, which increases the risk
of information compromise (Garba et al., 2015; Hovav & Putri, 2016).
The perceived ease of use of both private and enterprise Internet devices and access
largely had no statistical effect on the intention to use (H5a, H5b, H5d), with one
exception. The perceived ease of use of private Internet had a negative effect on the
intention to use enterprise Internet (H5c: β=-0.234, p<0.05, f2 >0.02). These results may
have been influenced by the relatively well educated and professionally experienced
nature of the sample population; a population that has used both enterprise and personal
information systems for significant lengths of time and in a variety of settings. The
perception of risk on the perceived ease of use and usefulness of both private and
enterprise Internet (H1b, H2a, H2b) provides a similar result – with the exception of
perception of risk on perceived ease of use of private Internet (H1a: β=0.388, p<0.001, f2
>0.15). The fact that perceived risk only influenced the perceived ease of use of private
Internet may be the manifestation of burdensome or difficult policies or procedures when
using enterprise provided Internet.
The perceived usability of both private and enterprise Internet on the intention to use
(H6b, H6c, H6d) follows the same pattern, with the exception that the perceived usability
of private Internet strongly affects the intention to use private Internet positively (H6a:
β=0.595, p<0.001, f2 >0.35). These results represent that a preference is shown towards
using private Internet because it is perceived as being easier to use, more useful, and less
risky than using enterprise provided Internet and devices. The positive relationship
between perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness of both private and enterprise
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Internet and devices represented in hypotheses H4a and H4b are well supported by the
literature.
One of the most significant challenges facing this study was that it relies on reported
behavior vice actual behavior. As discussed previously, responses can be biased towards
socially desirable answers (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), and significant variability exists
between reported actions and their actual frequency of use (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).
Additionally, self-selection response bias may be present due to the fact respondents
chose whether to participate or not. While this study supported the central research idea
that as the perception of risk increases when using enterprise Internet and devices
individuals may choose to forgo using these devices in favor of their own private Internet
and devices, the scope and scale of these relationships may be exaggerated or minimized
due to the reliance on survey data. Another challenge was the number of participants and
the inability to validate, beyond the use of qualification questions and disseminating
requests to complete the survey within Intelligence Community enclaves, that the
participants were in fact members of the IC due to the anonymized method of data
collection. The number of participants (N=240) exceeds the minimum threshold of 50 for
statistical power and confidence (Barclay et al., 1995; Chin & Newsted, 1999), but
additional samples could provide more robust generalizability. One of the strengths of
this study was the high degree of internal consistency and reliability, with every construct
indicating Cronbach's α and Composite Reliability scores exceeding 0.750, representing a
lack of multicollinearity. Another strength was the diversity of gender, age, and
experience among the IC population sample, providing a broad cross-section of
responses.
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Implications
This study provides insights into the intention of employees to use private Internet and
devices to conduct work related tasks when enterprise provided Internet and devices are
considered risky, cumbersome or difficult to use. The demarcation of private devices and
Internet from enterprise Internet and devices within the milieu of the sample population,
as well as the likelihood of pernicious and persistent attempts to obtain insights into
Internet usage by adversaries is likely to be an unusual circumstance for most
organizations. However, the threat posed by the incidental or accidental release of
information when users avoid using provided enterprise information systems in order to
more efficiently access information applies to organizations of all sizes and types.
The results of this study provide support to the concept that organizations must do
more to balance threats to information systems with threats to information security. The
imposition of safeguards to protect networks and systems, as well as employee misuse of
information technology resources, may unwittingly incentivize users to use their own
Internet and devices instead, where enterprise safeguards and protections are absent. This
incentive is particularly pronounced when organizations increase the perceived threat of
risk to users, whether intentional or inadvertent, and when the perception of the ease of
use and usefulness of private Internet devices is high. This study also provides insights
into user risk perception, allowing organizations to make informed decisions as to what
Internet use policies are appropriate and which policies induce risk that enterprise
provided systems will be avoided.
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Recommendations
This study, examining what effect the perception of risk has on the intention of
individuals to choose between enterprise or personal Internet and devices to do work
related tasks, provides an incremental advancement in the literature of information
systems. Based on the analysis of this study, as well as the study’s exploratory nature,
several recommendations are provided to further this line of research.
The first recommendation is to conduct appropriately tailored versions of this study
across a broad array of organizations, including government entities at the federal, state,
and local levels, within academic institutions, and private organizations to assess whether
the risk effects are broadly generalizable. Further empirical studies would provide
additional support to the theoretical concepts of risk developed in this study and its
impact on individual choices selecting between an enterprise and private environment.
The second recommendation is to incorporate the perception of risk of using private
Internet and devices as an additional exogenous construct into the research model, which
would facilitate cross comparison of the effect risk has on intention to use behaviors as
well as ease of use and usefulness measures. The third recommendation is to assess
whether moderating variables derived from the UTAUT model, such as age, gender, and
experience (Venkatesh et al., 2003; M. Williams et al., 2015), have a significant effect.
The fourth recommendation is to assess whether measures of facilitating conditions for
both enterprise and personally owned Internet access have a significant effect on
intention to use behaviors, especially when selecting between organizational and private
Internet and devices as influenced by perceived risk.
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Summary
Securing information systems against external threats is often the primary motivation
of information security professionals (T. Brown, 2018; Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Wang,
2019), but protecting critical information, as well as systems, is a necessary and essential
component of a holistic organizational security effort. When critical information is
potentially exposed by non-malicious insiders who use personal devices to conduct work
related tasks outside of the organizational information systems infrastructure, the
organization loses both visibility of the potential loss and is unable to provide appropriate
safeguards to prevent information compromise. When organizations increase the
perception of risk when using enterprise systems and networks to conduct work related
activities, or impose restrictions that impede the usefulness or ease of use of information
systems (Gundu & Flowerday, 2012; Hovav & Putri, 2016), they are inadvertently
incentivizing users to bypass these limitations and use personally owned devices and
Internet (Colvin, 2016), potentially increasing the risk of information compromise.
This study demonstrated that increases in the perception of risk when using enterprise
provided devices and Internet significantly affects the intention to use personally owned
devices and Internet to conduct work related tasks. It also demonstrated that the perceived
usefulness of personally owned devices, compared to the usefulness of enterprise
provided devices, plays a significant role in intention to use behaviors.
The study’s limitations, strengths and weaknesses were identified and discussed. The
study’s implications, including the recognition that organizations must carefully balance
threats to information systems with threats to information security and imposing
restrictions which increase the perception of risk or impede user’s ability to perform their
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work introduce the possibility that outside resources may be used, such as personally
owned devices. Finally, several recommendations for future research opportunities were
provided. As a result of this study, the extant gap in the literature to understand the
motivations and choices employees make to choose between enterprise systems and
personal systems to accomplish work related tasks has been partially filled.

73

Appendix A: Institutional Review Board Approval
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Appendix B: Delphi Survey Questionnaire
Dear Panel Members,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the review of my survey! Your views, thoughts,
opinions, and suggestions are very appreciated. I know each of you are very busy and I
thank you for your time and attention.
Some background:
My dissertation research is incorporating a survey looking at how members of the
Intelligence Community obtain open source information from the Internet, and how the
perception of risk influences these choices. The theoretical framework is derived from the
two primary “technology acceptance use” theories and is attached to this email to help
provide context.
The survey questions are also derived from other validated studies and are related to each
of the constructs being reviewed. The survey includes some additional features to help
ensure validity and consistency, such as attention check questions as well as a few
questions completely unrelated to the study to help identify and minimize common
method bias, which is when the way the survey is administered affects the results. Several
demographic questions complete the survey, which should take on average about 20
minutes to finish.
Instructions:
I have attached a document that contains the survey as well as annotations and
background for each set of questions. You can also preview the survey as it will be
presented here: https://tp877.typeform.com/to/fOqHuzUe
Please review the wording, phrasing and sequence of the questions, the style of the
survey, and any other factor that could be misinterpreted, cause confusion, or cause
respondents to answer the survey in ways other than which is intended. The goal is the
ensure that the survey questions are clear, unambiguous, and easily answered by the study
population with clarity.
As you identify any issues or areas needing clarification, please identify the question
number (and sub-question as applicable) as this will help me ensure that the issue is
addressed. You can also use the document and make your comments there (Please use
another color font for text)
In order to ensure your confidentiality and to encourage open communication, each
participant is receiving a blind copy of this email. Please reply to this email with your
responses, questions, or anything else you may require.
Please provide any feedback you may have by 9 October 2020.
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Thank you for participating and let me know if you have any questions.

Tyler Pieron
PhD Candidate
Nova Southeastern University

The survey questions are examining the influence of perceived risk on the use of
personally owned Internet devices by U.S. Intelligence Community analysts conducting
Open Source research and are derived from previous validates studies. The study
questions are listed below and are numbered for easy reference. Text that appears in the
survey is indicated by BOLD text.
Annotations will be italicized and are not present in the survey itself and are provided to
assist you in reviewing the survey. All questions are mandatory, including demographic
questions. An attention check question is located within the survey as is a series of
questions to assess and control for common method bias, which helps to ensure that the
format of the survey itself doesn’t influence the responses.

0. Welcome Screen
1. Before we begin, we want you to be informed about the nature of the study,
who is conducting it, and any risks. A full printable version of this consent
form can be downloaded here: http://ow.ly/o45Y50BqoWO
If you choose not to participate, please close your browser.
Do you agree to participate in this study?
Respondents can choose between I Agree and I Disagree. If they choose Disagree,
the survey will exit.
2. First, we need to make sure you are part of the population we are trying to
reach with this survey. These two questions are YES/NO and serve to verify the
sample population. If either question is responded to with a NO, the survey will
exit. If both are yes, the survey will continue.
a. Are you a member of the United States Intelligence Community?
b. Do you use Open Source Intelligence as part of your work in the
Intelligence Community? (Open Source Intelligence is defined as
“…intelligence produced from publicly available information that is
collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an
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appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific
intelligence requirement”)
Excellent! You have been qualified as a member of the study population. This
study uses scales to measure your opinion on various questions. Please select
the response that most accurately captures how much you agree or disagree
with a particular statement.
The survey will now begin.
As a reminder, all answers are confidential and your participation is
completely voluntary.

3. The first section focuses on your thoughts on Information Security. (All
responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree
to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of the Internet is bolded to call
attention to the difference between questions.)
a. I would feel safe using my personal device/Internet to do research on
the same topics I research for work
b. I would feel safe using my work provided devices/Internet to do
Internet research
c. I’m worried that using my private devices and Internet to research
work topics could cause me problems.
d. I’m worried that using work provided devices and Internet to
research work topics could cause me problems.
e. I feel secure using my personal Internet to research publicly available
websites from other countries.
f. I feel secure using work provided Internet to research publicly
available websites from other countries.
g. I am more like to use my ▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁▁ Internet access for
Open Source research in the next two months. (This question has two
options)
i. Personal
ii. Work Provided
4. Great, now let's focus how easy (or hard) it is to use your personally owned
devices/Internet or work provided devices/Internet for Internet research. We
will begin with your own Internet access and devices you use at home. (All
responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree
to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of the Internet is bolded to call
attention to the difference between questions.)
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a. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related
Internet research, learning how to operate the Internet browser would
be easy for me.
b. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related
Internet research, I would find it easy to find the information I was
looking for.
c. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related
Internet research, my interaction with the applications I need to use
would be clear, effective and flexible.
d. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related
Internet research, it would be easy for me to become skilled at open
source research.
e. If I used my own Internet access and devices at home for work related
Internet research, I would find that the tools I need are easy to use.
f. Within the next two months, I am likely to use my own Internet access
and devices at home to do Open Source work.
The following questions are asking about enterprise (work) provided
Internet access and devices:
g. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for
work related Internet research, learning how to operate the Internet
browser would be easy for me.
h. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for
work related Internet research, I would find it easy to find the
information I was looking for.
i. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for
work related Internet research, my interaction with the applications I
need to use would be clear, effective and flexible.
j. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for
work related Internet research, it would be easy for me to become
skilled at open source research.
k. If I used enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for
work related Internet research, I would find that the tools I need are
easy to use.
l. Within the next two months, I am likely to use enterprise (work)
provided Internet access and devices to do Open Source work.
5. Now, we want to know how useful you find using your own devices and
Internet is compared to how useful your find work provided devices and
Internet is when doing Open Source research. (All responses are collected via
a 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. In each
question, the source of the Internet is bolded to call attention to the difference
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between questions.)
Over halfway there now, keep it up!
a. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work
related Internet research enables me to accomplish Internet research
more quickly.
b. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work
related Internet research improves my job performance.
c. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work
related Internet research increases my productivity.
d. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work
related Internet research enhances my effectiveness.
e. Using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices for work
related Internet research makes it easier to do my job.
f. I find using enterprise (work) provided Internet access and devices
useful to do work related Internet research.
g. We know there are a bunch of questions. Please select Strongly Agree
for this question. (This question is designed to ensure the participant is
paying attention to the questions).
h. I intend to use my enterprise (work) provided Internet access to do
Open Source research within the next two months
i. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet
research enables me to accomplish Internet research more quickly.
j. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet
research improves my job performance.
k. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet
research increases my productivity
l. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet
research enhances my effectiveness.
m. Using my own Internet access at home for work related Internet
research makes it easier to do my job.
n. Using my own Internet access at home is useful to do work related
Internet research.
o. I intend to use my personal Internet access to do Open Source
research within the next two months

6. This section is asking how likely you are to conduct Open Source research in
the near future. (These two questions are included to ensure internal consistency
and validity of the survey. All responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of
the Internet is bolded to call attention to the difference between questions.)
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a. I expect that I will use my work provided Internet access for Open
Source research in the next two months.
b. I expect that I will use my personal Internet access for Open Source
research in the next two months.
7. This section is asking about how you are doing and your satisfaction with life.
(This section helps to address Common Method Bias and are completely unrelated
to the study. Responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale)
a. In most ways, my life is close to my ideal.
b. So far, I have gotten the important things I want in life.
c. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.
8. This short section is asking whether you have to the tools and resources to do
Open Source research. All responses are collected via a 7-point Likert Scale
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. In each question, the source of
the Internet is bolded to call attention to the difference between questions.)
a. My enterprise (work) provides the technical resources and tools I need
to obtain Open Source information from the Internet myself.
b. I have the knowledge necessary to use enterprise provided open
source research tools on the Internet.
c. I have the technical resources and tools I need to obtain Open Source
information from the Internet using my own devices and Internet
access.
d. I have the knowledge necessary to use my own (not work provided)
open source research tools on the Internet.

9. OK, we are almost done!
Just a few demographic questions to help us analyze the data.
Don't worry - your responses are completely anonymous and will be
aggregated by category to protect your privacy.
a. Select the category that you belong to.
If you are in more than one category, please identify what role you serve
in the most.
a. Government Employee (Civilian)
b. Military
c. Contractor
b. Are you:
a. Male
b. Female
c. Other
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c. How old are you?
a. 18-24
b. 25-34
c. 35-44
d. 45-54
e. 55-64
f. 65+
d. Which of the following do you consider yourself to be?
a. Straight, this not gay or lesbian
b. Gay or Lesbian
c. Bisexual
d. Something else
e. What ethnic origin do you most closely identify with?
a. Hispanic or Latino
b. White or Caucasian
c. Black or African American
d. Native American or American Indian
e. Asian or Pacific Islander
f. Other
f. How long have you been in the Intelligence Community?
a. Less than 1 year
b. 1 to 3 years
c. 4 to 5 years
d. 6 to 10 years
e. 11 to 20 years
f. More than 20 years
g. What is your pay category/grade?
Please choose one of the following answers. If you belong to another scale
system, i.e. contractor, pay banding, or military, please select the
grouping that best reflects your equivalent pay/grade category
(Members of the IC are assigned equivalent pay grades based on position and
function and respondents will have no issues responding accurately)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

GS 1-5
GS 6-9
GS 10-12
GS 13-14
GS 15
Senior Executive Service or DISL

81
h. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?
a. Less than High School
b. High School Diploma/GED or equivalent
c. Trade or Technical Certificate
d. Some College (no degree)
e. Associate Degree (e.g., AA, AS)
f. Bachelor's Degree (e.g., BA, BS)
g. Master's Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)
h. Professional Degree (e.g., MD, DDS, JD)
i. Doctorate Degree (e.g., PhD, Ed.D)
i. Indicate the mission category that best fits your position. (The primary
function of members of the IC determines what authorities and requirements
they are expected to comply with and what their day to day job functions are.
This is a standard demographic question within IC based surveys)
a. COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS - Positions that involve the
collection and reporting of information obtained from sources by
various means, including human and technical means, as well as
occupations involved in intelligence operations.
b. PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION - Occupations or positions
that involve the conversion of information collected from various
intelligence sources into a form that can be analyzed to produce an
intelligence product.
c. ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION - Occupations or positions that
involve the preparation of a finished intelligence product from
information obtained and processed from one or more intelligence
sources in support of customer requirements.
d. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY - Occupations or positions
that involve basic, applied, and advanced scientific and
engineering research and development.
e. ENTERPRISE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY - Positions that
support the organization's information systems. This category
includes telecommunications, network operations, operation and
maintenance of common user systems, and computing
infrastructure.
f. ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT- Occupations or
positions that involve support for the organization's human,
financial, physical, and other resources, such as financial
management, human resources management, and acquisition.
g. MISSION MANAGEMENT- Occupations or positions that involve
the coordination and integration of IC-wide intelligence
requirements, resources, and activities.
10. Exit Screen
You have completed the survey!
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If you know other members of the IC that might want to help this research,
please share the link.
(Please close your browser to exit the survey)
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Appendix E: Sample Recruitment Letter or Email
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Appendix F: Survey Questionnaire
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